The Director

2 August 1950

Acting Executive

IIIS Program

31 July in Shrow

- 1. The attached menorandum from Chief, COAPS, appears to be negative in approach to a problem which I believe at this time requires more positive action.
- 2. The primary problem to be solved now appears to be:
 Is or is not the HIS program considered essential by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, if it is, what is considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the minimum effort essential to meet the current cituation and thereafter, their estimates by priority, or ext what may be needed to meet future developments.
- 3. In view of the attitude end lack of action of the IAC agencies in the IAE field, it is not believed that we can expect any real assistance from them either in determining what the problem is or in meeting the problem once it has been determined, without a strong positive direction from the Joint Chiefs which may be used by CIA as a basis for insisting on results.

4. Recommends

- s. That the Joint Chiefs of Steff be immediately requested to inform CIA
 - (1) whether or not the HE program to essential to defense needs,
 - (2) if it is essential, what portions are needed immediately and wint priorities should apply to further HIS production, and
 - (3) what action has been taken by the Joint Chiefs to require necessary support and production on the part of the individual military intelligence agencies to neet the established JCS requirements.

b. Upon receipt of the above-requested information from the Joint Chiefs, CIA should

- (1) ascertain immediately both the willingness and the capability of the intelligence agencies concerned to meet the requirements prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
- (2) present whatever recommunications may be necessary to the Hetional Security Council in order to incure full implementation of whatever program has been determined to be essential.

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